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INWARD BOUND

by George Morgenstern

Many million voters speaking in an election sometimes produce an inarticulate effect. This is bound to be so because they are expressing both resentment and aspiration. They are against something, and desire something else. Again, confusion arises because of the multiplicity of the vote bait to which the citizen must respond one way or another.

Thus, if a Democratic aspirant for Senator in Iowa is rejected at the polls, is his defeat to be attributed to antipathy to the Brannan Plan, opposition to political medicine, distaste for high taxes, fear of inflation, dislike of the President, or does it follow because the voter objects to the conscription of his son, worries about the fate of a nephew in Korea, objects to underwriting British Socialism through the Marshall Plan or thinks that Secretary Acheson has been too partial to Communists in the State Department?

Because it is impossible to know the individual motivation of every voter among almost 41 million, the results of any election may be interpreted to taste. Those of November 7 will accommodate a variety of prejudices. That the GOP made a strong comeback and that the Fair Dealers took a tumble cannot be gainsaid. But what were the grounds upon which the voters administered this reproof to the Administration?

This question would be easier to answer if the Republican Party were not of such mixed character. A party that includes a Taft, a Millikin, a Dirksen, a Hickenlooper, and a Capehart on one side, a Morse and a Tobey on the other, and a Dewey floating in limbo between is not subject to easy generalization. Nor is the party position on foreign policy rendered more clear by the past acceptance by many of its members of "bipartisan" as an article of faith. Republicans who bought that gold brick ran out on their obligation to constitute an opposition.

At its best, the bipartisan approach to foreign affairs produced a blackout of intelligent debate in Congress and the Press: "blind covenants blindly arrived at", as Alf Landon once described the process. At its worst, it plunged the United States into a series of awful messes, one worse than the other, of which the Berlin airlift, the loss of China to Communism, the enormous continuing drain of the cold war, and the war in Korea, may be mentioned in ascending order.

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If the American people finally come to comprehend that a policy supposedly promising peace and security was bringing them mounting insecurity, war, and the prospect of national bankruptcy, they owed few thanks for the illumination to those Republicans who had stepped into the bipartisan trap. But, denied instruction and guidance from many of the Republican leadership, the voters educated themselves through exposure to developing events. In the absence of a cohesive political opposition to the foreign policy of Secretary Acheson and Mr. Truman, they created one by their own act November 7.

The unmistakable mandate they gave is that America is not expendable. If the GOP heeds this, it will return to power in 1952.

II

What has been done and said since the election indicates that the command has been properly understood. The internationalist Fair Dealers of course, are attempting to reassure themselves that nothing has changed at all. Mr. Acheson, for example, promptly said that he did not intend to resign, that he did not think the election results constituted a repudiation of Administration foreign policy, and that he hoped that Congress and the people would want to close ranks and see the country through.

Other interested parties endeavored to persuade the voters that they really hadn't meant what they said at the polls. The New York Times, in its best pulpit manner, stated that it saw "no evidence of a swing toward 'isolation' in the results", but thought an added dash of bipartisanship, supplemented by "efforts to enlist a larger measure of self-help on the part of our allies in rebuilding the democratic front", would suffice.

But the blues were sung quite frankly by the always faithful Marquis Childs, who saw a recrudescence of "sour and gloomy" isolationism, bemoaned that the incapacity of Senator Vandenberg rendered doubtful a further exercise of his "high-level leadership", and predicted that the election meant no good "for the difficult, perhaps impossible task of building a coalition of nations dedicated to peace and freedom".

Meanwhile, the first expression from the victorious Republican camp came from Senator Robert Taft, whose smashing personal triumph in Ohio returns him to Washington with his already great prestige enormously enhanced. Significantly enough, Taft's comments on the conduct of foreign policy appeared in a weekly newspaper column the day after election but had been prepared before the election. That he had formulated his views in advance of the decision demonstrated that he had correctly appraised the sentiment of the voters on this as well as on other issues.

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Taft charged that the Administration had pursued a policy of secrecy and undertaken to deal with issues abroad without giving the people any chance to decide what they really want. He demanded the answers to six questions before any further commitments are made for defending Western Europe. He said:

1. How many American soldiers will be required and what will be the additional cost?
2. How much will it increase the necessity of drafting every American boy, as he becomes 18 years of age, for two years' service in the Army?
3. Can Western Europe really be defended?
4. If the Russians have atomic bombs with which they can bomb the cities in this country -- as stated by military authorities -- can they also bomb the embarkation ports in Europe and cut off our troops there from American supplies?
5. What will a third World War look like?
6. How do we finally win it?

III

No questions as sharp and practical as these, directed at the fundamental assumptions of Administration foreign policy, have been heard around Washington for a long time. They strip most of the pretense from the spread-eagle strategy that looks so nice on paper but could easily lead to the results against which Charles A. Beard warned:

"The further away from its base on the American continent the Government of the United States seeks to exert power over the affairs and relations of other countries the weaker its efficiency becomes; and the further it oversteps the limits of its strength the more likely it is to lead this nation into disaster -- a terrible defeat in a war in Europe or Asia beyond the conquering power of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. If the wrecks of overextended empires scattered through the centuries offer any instruction to the living present, it is that a quest for absolute power not only corrupts but in time destroys."

Mr. Truman, unfortunately, engaged in no wide reading of history in the seminars of the Pendergast school; otherwise he might have thought twice about inviting the unpredictable consequences of his adventure in Asia. Those who applauded him most fervently are now crying a warning against conflict with China's 450 millions. The sidewalk engineer can always see the threat of the hoisting block, but frequently not in time.

For 10 years America has been outward bound. Its men, its money, and its resources have been dedicated to a crazy attempt to order the affairs of the world according to a vision that never was and never will be. The word "crazy" is used advisedly. According to Borchard of Yale, John Bassett Moore in at least three places in his forthcoming memoirs "characterizes the policy of this Government -- if it can be called a policy -- as 'insane'".

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We are now very close to the payoff. Perhaps some miracle can save us, though we have raised up the engines of our own destruction. The lessons that the people appear to have learned in 1950 are those which they might better have mastered in 1940. At last they seem to have apprehended that the survival of America should take precedence over the world-saving trade. They don't want war; they don't want their sons taken away and killed; they don't want to be reduced to penury. They wanted these things no more in 1940, but they could not withstand the propaganda and the lies and the secret maneuvering.

"Roosevelt", writes Professor Thomas A. Bailey, "repeatedly deceived the people during the period before Pearl Harbor. . . . He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he let the people slumber in a fog of isolation, they might well fall prey to Hiter. If he came out unequivocally for intervention, he would be defeated in 1940."

IV

The verdict of November 7 is that the people have had enough of Presidential divinity. Unquestionably, says Senator Taft, some sacrifice is necessary if we are to be protected against the real threat of Soviet aggression. "But the facts ought to be clearly brought before the people and they must be satisfied in their own minds that the sacrifice is essential."

Thus the election requires a return to Constitutional, representative government. There must be no more wars by executive fiat, as in Korea. There must be no further surrender of the war-making power of Congress, as in the Atlantic Pact; no yielding of the power of decision over policy, objective, and means to the Executive and the military, as occurred when they pledged 10 additional divisions to Europe.

There is, in the 82nd Congress, the power to enforce Congressional authority in conformity with the will of the people. The means reposes in the coalition of Republicans and Democrats (mostly Southerners) which is anathema to professional right-thinkers and to Mr. Truman. In the Senate 42 Republicans who will follow the leadership of Senators Taft and Millikin have been counted, together with 12 Democrats who will join in opposing proposals basic to the Fair Deal. This provides a safe majority of 54. In the House the comparable count is 184 Republicans and 49 Democrats, for a total of 233, 15 over the necessary majority.

Whether the Southerners will stay put on a question of opposition of foreign policy remains to be seen. The South fought a war against intervention in its affairs. It has not been so consistent in dealing with interventions abroad. But, however this coalition works, Republicans cannot suffer by complying with the expressed will of the people that America's sons, wealth and resources must be conserved for America.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 46

By Frank C. Hanighen November 15, 1950

THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLIGHT: Mr. Truman's leadership in his own party is reduced, and his whole economic, social and political program is challenged in Congress, in the election's outcome. Loss through defeat of top Administration leaders in the Senate will necessitate starting over with a new team, with strengthened ranks of those who have been unsympathetic to the Fair Deal and earlier New Deal, and differing with Mr. Truman in matters both at home and abroad. The Truman leadership in the House was more successful in surviving the election, but here again the ranks of Truman "staunch adherents are reduced". In neither branch can he expect to muster a majority on a controversial issue, or even in sustaining a veto on a contested measure. While Republicans have moved within two members short of actual control in the Senate, and are in a challenging position in the House, the ranks of die-hard Truman supporters in the Senate are further reduced through elimination of Pepper (D., Fla.) and Graham (D., N.C.), and their replacement by Southerners who have been generally opposed to Mr. Truman on controversial questions.

Laws to which Mr. Truman has voiced vigorous objection, especially the Taft-Hartley and McCarran anti-Communist acts, will not be repealed, but are in prospect of being amended and "streamlined", and probably strengthened. The Wood bill, as a substitute labor law, may be revived in the new House. Only a last minute rally in the House to recommit prevented its passage in this Congress.

The new Congress will be inclined to listen to the military chiefs on what is needed in national defense rather than the White House budget makers. Unessential spending, and unessential Federal agencies, will unquestionably be curbed by Appropriation committees. Spending for national defense will increase vastly, with more careful appraisal all along the line, but there will be a stronger effort to make corresponding cutbacks in unessential spending.

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ON THE HILL: There is some reason to believe that a majority of Democratic Senators can get together on Senator Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona for Majority Leader in the Senate. Since the election, a good many long-distance phone conversations have been going on and the upshot seems to be that McFarland, while not an announced candidate, would take the position. He hasn't been in the Senate long enough to have become any world-beater. But he is regarded as "steady, safe and sound". Also, he is about the only eligible who would accept the position, and win election.

---- Questions of organization in the new Congress will have to wait its convening. No one can foretell the action of party caucuses in selecting new leaders, and several days at the start may be consumed in making decisions. It is significant, however, that members of both Parties, in both Houses, who have been adherents of the Republican and Southern Democrat coalition have been reelected except where they voluntarily retired. This coalition, always informal, and usually functioning on social and economic issues, will have its part in the new Congress: its adherents will be larger in both branches.

---- Republicans in both branches of Congress will insist on restoration of the Committee apportionment of the 79th Congress, when the ratio was usually one Democrat in excess of equal division. Under manipulations of Mr. Truman and Senate Secretary Biffle in 1948, this ratio was scaled downward in the 81st Congress, giv-

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ing committees from 8 to 10 Democrats, and usually 5 Republicans. Northern Democrats will resist this change; Southern Democrats will insist on it. The outcome will be further removal of Mr. Truman from influence in legislative action.

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CABINET SHIFTS: There always have been post-election changes in the higher echelons of the Executive. This year can hardly prove an exception. Many here say the Acheson, Brannan, Oscar Ewing, Frank Pace, Jr., Francis Matthews, and probably a number of the Undersecretaries, will either go out or be shifted into new roles. Mr. Truman gives no hint of prospective changes, but his hand is being forced by political exigencies.

Secretary Acheson may be the first to succumb. Among Capital observers, he is not expected to long survive the wave of Republican criticism over his course in the Far East. Bipartisan foreign policy went out the window when Acheson came in, and the Far Eastern muddle is charged to his own making. It evidently had a part in the outcome of the voting.

Possibility of Averell Harriman succeeding Acheson in the State Department is just about nil. In appearing before the AFL convention in Houston and charging Senator Taft with "furthering designs of the Kremlin", he dealt a blow to bipartisanship in foreign policy. He could scarcely survive a certain battle over Senate confirmation. The successor to Acheson? The betting is on Chief Justice Vinson.

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SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS: Mr. Truman, who has usually given Southern Democrats the rough side of his tongue since he entered the White House, must now turn to them if he hopes to rebuild his Party from its 1950 defeat. With the Party's battered lines in the North, he can scarcely afford another Dixiecrat insurrection. Mr. Byrnes, as Governor of South Carolina, can be expected to have a weighty voice in party matters; he's not likely to give Mr. Truman much comfort since President Truman labelled him "a miserable failure" as Secretary of State. Leaders of the Northern wing of Democrats are beginning to make overtures to the Southern wing; the first time this phenomenon has been observed in some years.

Indication is that Southern stalwarts will be slow in responding to "peace gestures" of Northern left-wingers in Democratic ranks. After abolition of the two-thirds rule (for nominations in Democratic conventions) in 1936, the Southerners have generally met with cold shift in party matters and with attempts often to force down their throats whatever current proposal was being cooked up by a hybrid New Deal contingent. Southerners have long felt they had nothing in common with the Northerners except a political mesalliance. As a preliminary condition to "peace", they can be expected to insist on restoration of the two-thirds rule, or some equally compensating concession. This in itself would have considerable effect in driving out radicals, labor bosses, left-wingers, and various types of political adventurers, opportunists and self-seekers who have crept into the Party.

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GOP IN THE EAST: It is not all jubilation and rosy dreaming in Republican circles today after the election. The fact that the victory was largely in the West has not escaped the attention of Party leaders. They realize that the GOP hardly made a brilliant record in the Eastern industrial states, and hence there is much talk of what to do about New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. The electoral votes of those states are needed to win in 1952.

We learn from authoritative circles in Connecticut that the deal (at least, it is widely believed to have been a deal) between Republicans and Democrats in that state had serious consequences on the GOP showing. They say that impaired Party morale, resulting from widespread knowledge and discussion of the deal, not only cut

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down the majority won by Gubernatorial candidate John Davis Lodge, but also helped defeat GOP Senatorial candidate Prescott Bush. The "fix-up" is said to have involved throwing of Republican support to incumbent Democratic Senator Brien McMahon. In short, while Maryland voters stamped on Tydingsism, Republicans saved McMahon, the confederate of Tydings in the whitewashing of Senator McCarthy's charges. Today, no wonder that some Connecticut GOP leaders describe the morale of Party workers as "appalling".

In New York, the putative deal between Dewey and Lehman forces has been widely and gravely discussed. As reported on Novmber 1, the alleged deal (whether in fact there was such a deal or not) is accepted as a fact by politicos out in the country and among GOP Senators who desperately wanted that New York seat on their side of the aisle. Then, there is a discouraging picture in New Jersey, where the "me too" Driscoll regime is in control. As for Massachusetts, the remark is made: "That is out of this world", as observers discuss the stuffy, exclusive club which runs the state Party organization. "Massachusetts", said one of its most distinguished members to us recently, "will never go Republican again as long as the Party is run on the lines of a Beacon Hill club". Finally, the sharp Party cleavage in Pennsylvania had serious effects on the voting, as may be seen in the narrow majority of Duff. All in all, the lesson may be read in the fact that while the GOP registered a net gain of four House seats in Illinois and five in Indiana, it made no gains at all in New Jersey and only two in New York. Obviously, the broom should be wielded first in the East.

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GOP NATIONAL COMMITTEE: There has circulated in our town a bland -- perhaps too bland -- assumption that because the Republican Party scored great gains, therefore the Republican National Committee, in its cloistered old residence on Connecticut Avenue, should share equally with others in the laurels and plaudits of victory. Within the Party hierarchy, of course, amenities must be observed, and in those quarters little is said (publicly) on the merits of that question. However, malicious souls in the rank and file have taken an unkind interest in an editorial (November 12) in the Washington Times Herald, the local Republican newspaper. It paid tribute to the candidates, and to the "Team That Sparked the Victory" -- Senator Owen Brewster, Chairman of the Senatorial Campaign Committee, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and Representative Leonard Hall, Chairman of the House Campaign Committee. But, it failed to mention Chairman Gabrielson and his National Committee.

The omission may or may not have been an accident. However, it is a fact that the main burden did fall on the shoulders of Brewster and Hall; and that Senator McCarthy deserves a lot of credit for victory. For our part, we think that Mr. Gabrielson showed a lot of diligence. But listening to Party workers, we learn that such a performance is not enough. When one would say, "after all the National Committee committed no boners", others visibly found that achievement of little inspiration. It is true that Mr. Gabrielson's reign has appeared like a period of welcome peace after the rather too lively term of Congressman Hugh Scott, his predecessor, but Party workers retort: "Yes, the peace of a mortuary." We have warned Party hotspurs that unity is necssary and that ere long they may find the National Committee a grateful pool of tranquillity. But -- and we admit this is a healthy sign -- the militants will have naught of such conservative talk. We even heard one pungent exchange as follows: "Well, it is a fact that Bill Mylander (Gabrielson's Publicity Director) missed fewer tricks than Gabrielson." To which came the reply: "Give him time -- he's a much younger man."

Well, youth will have its fling. And we don't intimate that youth shouldn't. However, we do say that the cries of youth are being heard in the higher echelons of the leaders in the field. And come December when Party chiefs meet (behind closed doors, of course), there may take place a reconsideration of Chairman Gabrielson and his team.

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BOND-OOGLING: Once upon a time, a Yale Economist, Irving Fisher, proposed a "rubber" dollar. Now, Harvard Economist Sumner Schlichter has come up with a "rubber" bond. He offers it as a solution of the government's difficult fiscal problem: how to sell more "savings bonds" to the public. What with the observable shrinkage in the purchasing value of the dollar, the tendency is to spend it quickly on commodities or durables; or to invest it in something that has a chance to ride the inflationary wave, like land or stocks. People are not buying the Treasury's E bonds in quantities sufficient to offset redemptions. So, says Professor Schlichter, why not offer them a bond with an escalator clause; its redemption price would not be its face value, but would be tied in with the general price index. That would give the government bond a speculative character, for it would rise and fall with the purchasing value of the dollar.

The idea has not been taken up by the Treasury, but so many of the fiscal convolutions of the government were first designed in the ivory tower, that one cannot dismiss this one off-hand. The "rubber" bond could happen, and therefore some pertinent questions might be asked. If the redemption price is to be fixed by the price index, would not its sale price be likewise determined? Would the ticker tape carry the daily general price index, so that the Treasury and the public could estimate both the selling and redemption price of the bonds? If the index dropped, could not this result in the "bear" movement? Would the government permit "short" selling? How would interest be computed, on face or redemption value? Thus, as will be seen, the idea lends itself to many speculative thoughts, including the bizarre one about the possible manipulation of the general index price for political purposes.

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THAT TIMES BOOK REVIEW SECTION: An important book, Invasion -- 1944, by General Hans Speidel has just been published (Henry Regnery Company). It is a first-hand account of Rommel's Normandy campaign, written by his Chief of Staff; and it has an excellent introduction by Colonel Truman Smith (U.S.A., Rtd.), who is well known in American military circles as General Marshall's expert on the German Army during World War II. Any reasonable person would suppose that the book review editor of the Times would have assigned this volume to Hanson Baldwin, the paper's military editor; or to some other recognized military authority. Not so. The review which appeared on November 5 in the Times was authored by Drew Middleton, whose dispatches from Germany have been likened to publicity releases of the notoriously anti-German Society for the Prevention of World War III. Middleton, indeed, runs true to form in the review. You can't trust Speidel, you can't trust Rommel -- in short you can't ever, under any circumstances, trust any German. If the Times book review editor had expected anything different from Middleton, he couldn't have read his own newspaper's dispatches from Germany.

In pleasant contrast, was the fair and expert review in the New York Herald Tribune's "Books" (Also November 5). Miss Van Doren has Gordon Craig, Professor of History at Princeton do the job and he gives quite a different picture from that in the Times. "If it were nothing more than an essay in military history, General Speidel's book would still be a notable contribution to the growing volume of literature on the Normandy campaign. . . . But Invasion -- 1944 is more than a battle report. It is an absorbing account of the duel between Rommel and Hitler, a bitter conflict which led, after the failure of the officers' revolt of July 20, to the murder of Hitler's 'favorite General'." Until recently, the Herald Tribune "Books'" record of unfairness was as black as the Times. Is this a sign of a wider change? And will the paper on 41st Street shame its larger neighbor on 43rd Street into better ways?

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By Bertrand de Jouvenel Paris -- November, 1950

AMERICA AND THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: If I were an American, I would, I think, be considerably annoyed to see no end to any prospect of subsidizing and protecting Western Europe. As a European I feel deeply worried about it. Not only is the relationship humiliating but it is also dangerous. There can be no unilateralism in human affairs.

It is a cardinal error of our times to believe that responsibility for others can be assumed without extension of authority over them. This error is bringing about in all our communities the loss of individual liberty, and in the case of European states the loss of their national independence. The present process cannot bring about a Union of Western European states with equal rights, because this would suppose an equal willingness to bear the common burden in proportion to the several strengths. The combination of European demands with American generosity threatens to bring about an unequal association, an American Empire, which the Europeans would resent, and they would place blame for it upon U.S. imperialism rather than upon their own weakness.

Therefore, it is all important to both Americans and Europeans that Europe should be set on its feet. After an indispensable interim period of rebuilding under the cover of American strength, Europe should become capable of assuming its own defense. I say "after an interim period". Sending military forces of the United States to Europe in proportion to European forces obviously does not meet the problem. American forces can be built up very much faster than European forces; they must be there while Europe is weak, and they can taper off as Europe's power is progressively built up.

That the "securing" of Europe by Europeans should present as many difficulties as it does must be intriguing to Americans when they can see in Europe, even apart from Britain, a wealth of men and industries which should be capable of holding its own with the Soviet power. A glance at the sweep of European history may cast some light upon the subject.

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THE EASTERN THREAT IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE: Four powers of Continental Europe, France, Italy, Belgium and Holland, have come together with Britain to face the Eastern threat. It must be understood that these nations have no familiarity with the Eastern threat. Although such a menace has hung over Europe during all its history, these nations have never had to meet it.

The continent of Europe has to be thought of as a sort of thin end of Asia, something like India. But India is marked off by a great chain of mountains, the Himalayas, while there is no geographic obstacle between Asia and Europe; the great plains of the east stretch right to the French ports of the Atlantic Ocean. It is a natural danger for the European peninsula that large masses of people from the enormous lands beyond should sweep into it: thus Attila, thus Genghis-Khan, coming from the very depths of Asia. This danger, however, has always been completely lost sight of by the Western nations who dwell on the Atlantic fringe, because it has in the past been warded off by others.

Five centuries ago this menace was embodied by the Ottoman Turks: in 1953 we shall, or we might, commemorate the fifth centenary of the fall of Constantinople. The dreadful sequel to that event is barely mentioned in the history taught to the children of Western Europe. The bloody conquest of the Balkans and the reduction

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of their peoples to serfdom, the smashing of the brilliant Hungarian kingdom, the threat to Vienna, the formidable struggle sustained by the Hapsburgs with the cooperation of Venice on the sea and of Poland on land, the two sieges of Vienna, and the final forcing back of the Ottoman power by that great leader of Austrian armies, Prince Eugene of Savoy -- these extremely important pages of European history which stretch over two hundred and fifty years, and are an epic of Europe, are practically unknown to the Frenchman or Englishman. Their nations were out of it all. More than that, while the Empire of the Hapsburgs was locked in a life or death struggle with the Eastern invader, it was at the same time engaged in continuous rivalry with France.

Let us underline this double tension: it is the decisive feature of European history. For something like a thousand years, Europe has always had in its center a power called into being by an Eastern threat, and which by virtue of its function, thought of itself as imperial, as leading all Christendom. But its consequent claims to predominance, while they were acceptable to those directly threatened, were not acceptable to the Western powers who, finding themselves shielded, thought nothing of the Eastern menace and were concerned only to fight imperial insolence. Thus the vital struggle of center against East was ever complicated by a continuing squabble between Center and West, which the West is apt to regard as the only important thing. So far does the past illuminate the present.

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RUSSIA AS A FACTOR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: The beginning of Moscovia as a power coincides approximately with the fall of Constantinople. This was of great service to Europe in that it locked the northeastern road of Asiatic invasions. Moscovia's main expansion was to the south, south-east and east; thus it grew into a mighty empire; but it was not long before it also turned its ambitions westward. In the 18th Century it broke the then great power of Sweden and went on to destroy Poland utterly. For the final murder of this historic state, Catherine the Great, the idol of philosophers, obtained the complicity of another such idol, Frederic the Great of Prussia, Maria-Theresa of Austria being drawn into the deed to which she lent reluctant hands.

It is well worthy of notice that this criminal act, which advanced Russia into Europe was made possible by Prussia. It springs to the eye, when ranging over history, that the combination of Russia with Prussia is deadly to Europe.

During the wars of the French Revolution, Russian troops were for the first time seen in Western Europe, fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland, under the leadership of Suvorov who is today exalted in Soviet Russia as the greatest national military figure. A bad omen. When Napoleon, with more military skill than political judgment, had driven his armies over the Austrian realm, he came to grips with Prussia, backed by Russia. Prussia, roughly treated, came to place her hopes in Russia.

Surely it is not irrelevant to our present problems to consider the situation which arose when the French were beaten out of Russia, and turned out of Prussia which had taken up arms against them. Then as now there was a western part of Germany allied with the West and a Prussia rearmed and excited by the Russians, and setting itself up as the liberator of all Germany! The outcome was the entry of Prussian and Russian troops together into Paris, at the close of the Napoleonic saga. There is then nothing of which the French must be more wary than the alliance of Berlin with Moscow.

It is to be stressed that thenceforth up to 1870 it was Russia not Prussia which inspired fear in Paris and worry in London. In 1851 Victor Hugo alarmed the French Parliament with eloquent forebodings of the Cossack's gallop into Paris.

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In order to prevent the taking over of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France found it necessary to fight Russia in the Crimea. It is worthy of notice that the need to stop Russia had been stressed in no uncertain terms by the Rhinelander, Karl Marx. He wrote in the New York Tribune:

> "Since Peter the Great, the Russian frontier has advanced towards Berlin, Dresden and Vienna by some 1.100 kilometers, towards Constantinople by 750, towards Teheran by some 1.600.
>
> ". . . During the last sixty years, Russia has acquired as much again as she previously held in Europe. Conquest breeds conquest, annexation follows upon annexation. It is therefore certain that the taking over of Turkey by Russia shall be but a prelude to engulfing of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and to the realization of this Slavic empire, the dream of some fanatic philosophers of Slavism.
>
> "To stop this policy of annexation is therefore a matter of the highest moment."

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THE FATAL COMBINATION OF RUSSIA AND GERMANY: Yet for all that has been said above, Germany not Russia has been the invader of France in three wars, of other Western European nations in two wars. To be sure, but note that the two successful onslaughts, that of 1870 and that of 1940, were made possible only, in the first case, by good relations between Germany and Russia, a policy which was an obsession of Bismarck; in the second case, by a positive agreement with Soviet Russia. Also in 1914 the French victory of the Marne was made possible by Russian pressure upon East Prussia: the great victory of the Germans in East Prussia, Tannenburg and the Masurian lakes was won at the cost of the Marne defeat. It follows therefrom that Russo-German amity is fatal to Europe.

From all that has been said I hope that a clear picture emerges. The first point is that Western Europe has been traditionally shielded from the Eastern menace and tends to be bewildered when suddenly faced with it.

The second point is that the shielding has traditionally been assumed by a Central empire under Germanic leadership which has tended to behave overbearingly to its Western neighbors. And a very positive danger to them has arisen when the Central power made its peace with the East in order to drive westward.

The third point is that, in view of their troubles having been with the Germanic powers, the Western nations have imprudently desired the overthrow of these powers which was achieved by American forces; and they are instinctively afraid of a restoration of a Central power which, however, they need. We might push our statement further and say that such is the historical distrust of the Germanic Central power that should it become strong enough to shield Europe by itself, it would also therefore be so strong as to frighten the French back into a balancing alliance with Russia!

The fourth point is that no danger to Europe is so great as the addition of the Germanic force to the Russian force, a phenomenon which the Russians caused in 1813 and are attempting to cause again by making Eastern Germany the "liberating nucleus" of a Red Germany which would drive westward.

I am sorry if the picture which I have drawn here appears complex: no more fatal error can be made than to read the European problem in terms of the problem so admirably solved by the Thirteen Colonies.

What conclusions can we now draw from our picture? First and foremost that our utmost danger lies in the winning over of Western Germany by Eastern Germany. If this should take place, then it were time to "roll up the map of Europe". Therefore nothing must be spared to foster in the Germans a willingness to resume

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their role of European shield. The present Germany is, however, far too weak to play this role by itself. It can fulfill it only in combination with the Western powers, mainly with France.

This can hardly fail to revive in another form a long-standing difficulty. It is in the nature of things that relative importance in this combination should follow from the relative weights of contributions. If Germany, as nearer to the danger, should prove more willing, she would inevitably assume the greater importance which would very probably cause France to break away. Therefore it appears that it is all important to the success of the combination to have a French government capable of inspiring the nation with a will to play a decisive part in the defense of Europe. I must admit I have almost lost hope that any government of the present brand can do this.

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WARNING OF ANTAGONISMS AHEAD: I attach but little immediate importance to the strong stand taken by some French representatives against German rearmament. Whatever his passion, M. Moch is far too intelligent not to realize that he will be overruled by the United States and that indeed he is but weakly backed by French opinion. His attitude of today will however benefit him greatly at some future time when Germany will be rearmed and restored to the full status of a major power (it should be evident that the two must go together) and when difficulties will arise with France, over the Saar and other points (which is to be regarded as inevitable). The more German rearmament will lessen the danger from Soviet Russia, the more it will center French attention on Franco-German rivalry. The front-line position of Germany will provide a foundation for a claim of no little importance, which will exasperate the French.

All this is based on the assumption that no real merger of European States will be effected, that they will go on with their several interests and historical antagonisms. This is an assumption I make with regret but I must admit the prospects of "Europe" as a union seem to me flagging rather than otherwise.

Doubtless it is out of respect for national sovereignties that the United States have failed to throw their weight behind the cause of union. It is perhaps a fancy but I have always thought, in view of America's immense gifts to Europe, that these might have been entrusted to a Committee of Europe which might have demanded of the national governments sacrifices of sovereignty which a foreign government, however good a friend, could not prescribe. Would it have been impossibly revolutionary to demand that the distributors of these gifts should be elected by the bulk of Europeans? Maybe it was impracticable, but as it is, the Europe which is being restored is a Europe addicted to its ancient rivalries.

The better it is nursed back to health, the more it seems to harden into its several, separate existences. Nor should a measure of trade liberalization be mistaken for anything more than it is. By a natural consequence, the very defense of national sovereignty against a process of merging leaves the several states most dependent upon their common protector, the United States.

Nothing, it seems to me, is more characteristic of the lack of real Europeanism than the perverse persistence of national governments in the arraignment of Germans before their own jurisdictions on the score of war crimes committed upon their territories. These travesties of justice are in fact nothing but occasions to indulge in explosions of national passion.

Editor's note: M. de Jouvenel informs us that he will arrive in the United States within the next fortnight. We hope to persuade him to write his impressions of America in this supplement next month.

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